Buscamos aqui revisitar a leitura de Gyorgy Lukács em História e Consciência de Classe sobre a questão da ação humana. Tendo a história como ponto culminante onde se resolve a relação sujeito-objeto, Lukács propõe uma epistemologia dialética em que o sujeito interfere no conteúdo do real. A problemática central consiste em teorizar a gênese, a geração do novo. A gênese tem sua determinação concreta na contradição da luta de classes. Isso resultará num novo conceito de sujeito. O indivíduo, isoladamente, é (...) incapaz de realizar a gênese. O sujeito da práxis, destarte, não pode ser livre atuando sozinho, mas deve encontrar o fundamento da liberdade na classe social, real sujeito da gênese histórica. We seek here to revisit Gyorgy Lukács' reading in History and Class Conscousness about the question on the human action. Taking at hand history as the culminating point where the relation subject-object is resolved, Lukács proposes a dialectical epistemology in which the subject interferes in the content of reality. The central problematic consists in theorizing the genesis, the genesis of the new. This results in a new concept of subject. The individual isolated is incapable of achieving the genesis. The subject of praxis cannot therefore be free acting alone, but he must find the fundament of freedom in the social class, the real subject of historical genesis. (shrink)

Young Hegel’s writings has been a source for many endeavours aiming at extracting edifying resources for contemporary ethical and political debate. In this paper, I focus on Hegel’s earliest writings – stemming from the periods of Stuttgart, Tubingen and Bern – in search for elements that can propel a conception of self. By endorsing an ethical and political stance of young Hegel’s writings, I oppose those who see in these writings concerning the essence of religion a mystical-pantheistic thesis. Instead, I (...) argue that Hegel is more concerned with a Republican view of religion, one that is very close to French political thought, such as Rousseau and Montesquieu. Just as much, the practical grounds for addressing ethical life and assessing Modernity’s capacity for the latter is rooted on a Hellenistic ideal. The Greek sources derive from young Hegel’s reading of the tragedies as comprising three notions: origin, simplicity and exteriority. I explore some features relating the notions of origin and simplicity as dating back to monastic life and the works of Winckelmann and Schiller. These elements are constantly intertwined in Hegel’s opposition to the rationalism of Enlightenment, mainly of Kant, as well as his adherence and reformulation of universal reason. Relying on these sources, I divide the paper into three sections: the enlightened self, the sensible self and the simple self. I conclude with the idea that Hegel envisaged a kind of sensible reason he often referred to by “heart”, by which he meant an originating and simple experience of the world through nature and the community that achieves universal practical reason by comprising socially shared perceptive, affective and imaginative resources at play at the moment of a putative moral action. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in (...) other works on Descartes. (shrink)

It is said that Europe finds itself today in a post-christian situa-tion. Further, there are many who advocate abandoning monotheism in order to get back to prechristian polytheism in the hope that the plurality of gods would favour a democratic tolerance in a pluralistic world. In this article the author firstly asks if European Christians have not gone back to adoring idols and to attempting to distinguish between them in the new forms of devotion to possessiveness, to power and to (...) pleasure. He then goes on to ask about the possibilities of pro-claiming the God of Jesus Christ. The third and the fourth part of the article point out several forms of necessary witness to God in contemporary society, with special reference made to European society in the conclusion. (shrink)

This article takes up Diogenes again, investigating some of the reasons Diogenes has been unappreciated, and making a case for Diogenes' mind-based teleology as a significant philosophical contribution. The sophists, too, have suffered from the charge, which goes back to Plato, of not being “real” philosophers. Diogenes did not bother himself with, or was not interested in, showing in what sense the world is organized in the best possible manner; this looked to him as something that happened as a (...) matter of course. What did interest him, on the other hand, was to show what the thing that exercised intelligence is. From this point of view, the emphasis is definitely not on teleology, but rather on noetics. Here, primary textual evidence is available, for the fragments, as well as Simplicius's presentation of them, definitely support the view that the point of Diogenes' argumentation was to show that intelligence is air's. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to situate our reading of the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades Major among both ancient and modern readings of the dialogue. Since the nineteenth century the issue of authenticity has preoccupied most modern commentators of the dialogue, but from all reasonable evidence, commentators from the ancient world had no such qualms about attributing the authorship of Alcibiades Major to Plato. Our reading of Alcibiades Major is in line with modern commentators who take both the dialogue's dramatic (...) features and educative value seriously, while not ignoring that in some quarters Alcibiades Major's authorship is still in dispute. ;Our treatment of Alcibiades Major differs from the attention given to it by past and present commentators, because it is our desire to see the ideas---expressed in the dialogue with such enthusiasm by Socrates and Alcibiades---entertained in a number of different contexts. For this reason we have titled the dissertation Socratic Encounters: Plato's Alcibiades, with each chapter designed to facilitate a kind of cross-fertilization of ideas from a variety of intellectual perspectives. Looking at the dialogue from various perspectives has allowed us to cast some new light on the dialogue from which other commentators may benefit. ;The objective of the dissertation to highlight Alcibiades Major's timeless insights and enduring relevance to contemporary issues, has led us on a course that revolves around pedagogy. The Platonic dialogues are gold-mines of insight, but knowing this to be the case does not answer the fundamental question: 'What did Plato intend to teach us by writing Alcibiades Major?' The dissertation goes to great lengths to provide answers to the question, and the answers it provides take unusual approaches. For example, Plato invites us to consider five issues in Alcibiades Major: appropriate listening, priorities, tradition, hypothetical questions, and women's role in male achievement. The dialogue is not limited to these five issues, but the dialogue cannot be seriously dealt with without considering them. (shrink)

The two main arguments concern(1) the presence of an “enlightened complementarity” between philosophic (including scientific) and religious (not including mystic) thought, and(2) the necessity to postulate a “threefold relationship” whenever one is to gain knowledge of any kind. They are both inspired by physics (from Bohr's “strict complementarity”, resp. from Newton's fundamental postulate).God's perfection resides at least in Symmetry in a generalized (not restrictively spatial) sense. Yet, as the argument goes, Space does not “exist” as a thing. Consequently, the (...) Great Geometer (God) cannot dwell within a World He creates, and it is wrong to speak about His (God's) ‘existence’; for, existence is bound to the temporal, and Time is, together with the World, part of God's creation. Thus the only possible creation consists in God separating World and Time from Himself: This is the paradigm of Symmetry-breaking.Polytheistic mythologies all assume such and such imperfection of their deities; hence perfection is meaningful for monotheism only. A relationship of a threefold (‘trinitary’) nature must then obtain between God, World, and Time; this is analogous to Newton's postulate relating force, momentum and time. Just as the latter and its specific generalizations must be “found true” by verification, the said threefold relationship must also be found true: within philosophic thoughtmore geometrico (in a generalized sense), within religious thoughtmore “hymnometrico”. Yet the complementarity (called “enlightened”) arising between the two kinds of thought is of a higher nature than Bohr's “strict” complementarity. While it can be understood from the role assumed by language itself, it can however only be disposed of within mystic contemplation. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further (...) to the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show how the film Der Himmel über Berlin (Wenders, 1987) allows for a phenomenological reflection on the bonds of human beings with the world. For this purpose, we submit the hypothesis that the thinking of Byung-Chul Han—who has demonstrated a particular interest in this specific film—, functions as a philosophical lens through which such a reading may be advanced. To that end, this paper has three sections: the first section sees Damiel, one of (...) the film’s main characters, as a vehicle to describe the lightness of the world and the angst resulting from not being able to bond with the weight of existence. The second section presents Peter Falk as the main trigger that causes Damiel to decide to enter the world of mortals and live a life exiled from eternity. Finally, we present Marion, Damiel’s romantic interest, as the main motivation for Damiel to renounce being an angel, as she fulfills the role of an Eros capable of triggering in the individual the vital strength to cause the subject to enter into a bond with the world. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Seneca’s philosophy is a form of therapy and that one of its main concerns is the transformation of one’s life through time control. Aristotelian tradition lies in the idea that philosophy is, in its highest aspect, an abstract form of knowledge. Seneca, on the other hand, is an inheritor of a long tradition that takes philosophy as mind or soul therapy and bases its structure in a practical approach. Epicurus, for instance, goes as (...) far as to declare that “empty is the word of the philosopher by whom no human suffering is treated”. Even if Seneca doesn’t despise the theoretical principles that support the construction of a philosophical system, he builds, in his Letters to Lucilius, a strong therapeutic praxis whose purpose is to heal one’s mind and life. The upmost and fundamental step is providing the pupil with different ways of earning back time deprivation. Time seems to be, in a certain sense, the essential matter of Seneca’s philosophy. Time control, for him, is a kind of self-control that would make it possible to match a simple existence and a meaningful life. Therefore, Seneca’s opening letter to Lucile aims exclusively to identify how one loses time and why it’s essential to take control of it. (shrink)

Depending on the dissemination of discursive forms through linguistic practices as well as a particular change in our contemporary doxa, the development language of collective social improvement has been based upon a particular mode of ontological naturalism. In a renewed version of the ontological mode that Descola termed “naturalism”, international development has set social expectations in terms of a progressive future framed by violent ruptures, crises, perils and a threat actual of human annihilation. This paper investigates how this developmental enterprise (...) and the consequent ideology of “developmentalism” have further expanded a bi-polar ontology. Since its inception, it articulates two radical sets of possibilities: one of infinite progress for humankind and one of its total annihilation according to the well-known metaphysics of possibilism. First, I will show how the institutionalization of development goes hand in hand with the emergence of a new form of naturalism that accentuates extreme possibilities as results of human action. My main claim here is that, after World War II, science and technology radicalized naturalism through the institutionalization of a new ideology. By presupposing a new transformational capability of science and technology, developmentalism furthers the naturalistic ontology. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se analiza si la versión de la justicia como equidad, presentada en El liberalismo político, es genuinamente una concepción política. Se examina el problema de la razonabilidad de las doctrinas comprehensivas, y se indaga luego si el argumento en dos etapas afecta la integridad estructural del liberalismo político. Se concluye que J. Rawls fracasa en su intento de justificar un liberalismo independiente de una doctrina comprehensiva de carácter liberal. ABSTRACT The article analyzes whether the conception of justice as fairness, (...) set forth by Rawls in Political Liberalism, is a genuine political conception. It first examines the issue of reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines and then goes on to inquire whether the two-step argument affects the structural integrity of political liberalism. The paper concludes that J. Rawls fails in his attempt to justify liberalism independently of a comprehensive liberal doctrine. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the idea of tragedy in Marx. A comparison between Capital and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884 is proposed, in order to assert that what happens to the human being goes through the understanding of his tragic condition in the bosom of capitalist production. It maintains that tragedy is the conflict in whose development the human being sacrifices his essential forces with the intention of producing new contents of life for him.

The study is based on the narrative structure of the film “Mindwalk”, Bernt Amadeus Capra, in which three characters of the plot (a scientist, a politician and a poet) meet and begin to talk about issues such as the influence of technology on society, the reduction of pollution and the degradation of nature. In a similar way, what is proposed is the interaction between three authors, three activities and three cultures, in this case, the English scientist, author of the Gaia (...) theory, James Lovelock, then the French philosopher Michel Serres, and the Brazilian poet Adriane Garcia. In this case, it is intended to show how areas and authors who are at first disparate - a scientific theory that considers life as a structural dynamic that defines the planet, a philosophical vision that seeks to overcome the so-called highways in the name of a systemic vision of the relationship between man and the Earth, and a style that takes history as a poetic key - find themselves in tune in the face of a dilemma that goes from the macro to the micro, in a not centered way, taking into account that all dynamics, all forms of existence are valid in the face of the previous standardized model of modernity and progress. (shrink)

Cismando com o dualismo cartesiano e seus desdobramentos em práticas e estruturas escolares contemporâneas nas margens do capitalismo Resumo: Esse texto relaciona conceitos que, advindos de áreas do conhecimento diferentes, fundamentam estruturas de subordinação e controle, próprios de muitas práticas e hábitos da vida de diversos povos que habitam as margens do capitalismo moderno e colonialista. Ao articular os desdobramentos trazidos por cada um desses personagens conceituais, nota-se o quanto eles se interseccionam ao fundamentar muito da forma de viver da (...) modernidade, sobretudo em contextos da periferia do capitalismo. Essa articulação se dá por meio de uma investigação bibliográfica sem deixar de refletir sobre as práticas da vida. Para tanto, inicia-se com uma descrição dos fundamentos dualistas cartesianos da ciência e da sociedade ocidental moderna. A seguir, busca-se descrever como esses conceitos se enredam em uma teia que institucionaliza hábitos típicos da estrutura de escola que vigora no país. Por fim, encaminham-se possibilidades de alternativas conceituais que refletem e sustentam práticas educacionais em direção à emancipação e superação das condições impostas pela modernidade/ colonialidade/capitalismo. Encerra-se o artigo com dois apontamentos resultantes do curso da pesquisa: conhecimento é criação, cultivo, cuidado; emancipar-se envolve, necessariamente, a ação de narrar a própria história. Palavras-chave: Educação; Emancipação; Modernidade/colonialidade/capitalismo. Doubting about cartesian dualism and its consequences in contemporary school practices and structures on the margins of capitalism Abstract: This text relates concepts that, coming from different areas of knowledge, underlie structures of subordination and control, typical of many practices and habits of life of different peoples who inhabit the margins of modern and colonialist capitalism. By articulating the developments brought about by each of these conceptual characters, it is possible to notice how much they intersect in grounding much of the way of living of modernity, especially in contexts on the periphery of capitalism. This articulation goes through a bibliographic investigation, without ceasing to reflect on the practices of life. To do so, it begins with a description of the Cartesian dualist foundations of science and modern Western society. Next, we seek to describe how these concepts are entangled in a web that institutionalizes typical habits of the school structure in force in the country. Finally, possibilities of conceptual alternatives that reflect and sustain educational practices towards emancipation and overcoming the conditions imposed by modernity/coloniality/capitalism are presented. The article ends by pointing out two paths resulting from the course of the research so far, that knowledge is creation, cultivation, care, and that emancipating oneself necessarily involves the action of narrating one's own history. Key-words: Education; Emancipation; Modernity/coloniality/capitalism. Dudando del dualismo cartesiano y sus consecuencias en las prácticas y estructuras escolares contemporáneas al margen del capitalismo Resumen: Este texto relaciona conceptos que, provenientes de diferentes áreas del conocimiento, subyacen en estructuras de subordinación y control, propias de muchas prácticas y hábitos de vida de diferentes pueblos que habitan los márgenes del capitalismo moderno y colonialista. Al articular los desarrollos provocados por cada uno de estos personajes conceptuales, es posible notar cuánto se cruzan al fundamentar gran parte de la forma de vida de la modernidad, especialmente en contextos en la periferia del capitalismo. Esta articulación se produce a través de una investigación bibliográfica, sin dejar de reflexionar sobre las prácticas de la vida. Para hacerlo, comienza con una descripción de los fundamentos dualistas cartesianos de la ciencia y la sociedad occidental moderna. A continuación, buscamos describir cómo estos conceptos se enredan en la red que institucionaliza hábitos típicos de la estructura escolar vigente en el país. Finalmente, se presentan posibilidades de alternativas conceptuales que reflejan y sustentan las prácticas educativas hacia la emancipación y la superación de las condiciones impuestas por la modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. El artículo finaliza señalando dos caminos resultantes del curso de la investigación hasta el momento, que el conocimiento es creación, cultivo, cuidado, y que emanciparse implica necesariamente la acción de narrar la propia historia. Palabras-clave: Educación; Emancipación; Modernidad/colonialidade/capitalismo. Data de registro: 18/08/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

We set out a fundamental ontology of atomism in terms of matter points. While being most parsimonious, this ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, and it remains a viable option for any future theory of cosmology that goes beyond current quantum physics. The matter points are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial (...) relations change. All that is needed to capture change is a dynamical structure, namely dynamical relations as expressed in terms of the dynamical parameters of a physical theory. (shrink)

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos (...) importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

The articles in the present issue are the result of a study day on William Desmond’s recent book, Ethics and the Between, held at the K.U.Leuven's Institute of Philosophy. This important book certainly deserves a thorough discussion and for many reasons. It is the manifestation of an ambition that reminds us of past periods in the history of philosophy. These days not so many philosophers venture to set up a body of work — three volumes — in the tradition of (...) the great philosophical systems that once tried to cover and understand the whole of reality. When reading Ethics and the Between, Hegel’s system comes to mind not only because we know that William Desmond is a Hegel scholar but also because of its ambition to give everything a place within an encompassing system.Of course Desmond takes care to explain where the difference lies between his metaxological approach and an insufficiently open and pluralist dialectics. His is an attempt to rethink the notion of system so that it is more hospitable to otherness as other, to the rich inexhaustibility of being. He wants to be true to the equivocities of our being and not to give in to the seduction of mediated univocity, as some forms of dialectics do. What is at stake in his work is not forgetting the surplus, the excess, the otherness of the good which suggests a transcendence of each dialectical completion in terms of self-determination.Desmond’s oeuvre is not only unusual today because of its systematic ambition. A second characteristic marks off more specifically his book on ethics: the attempt to write an ethics dominated by the idea of the good, raising the question of the relation between metaphysics and ethics, between being and being good. Desmond seems to tell us that something has been forgotten: the good which continues to be there incognito, present even in philosophies that forget it. This seems to be Desmond’s way of situating himself in an age characterized by the subtle ethos of valuelessness, the perplexity about the inherent value of being, of being as good; an age oscillating between foundationalist unity and postmodern plurality.If it were my task to give an introduction to Desmond’s thought I would have to pay attention to the richness of the concept of metaxu, the between, the way it seems to encompass the whole and keep it together, while at the same time being excessive. I would have to speak about the fourfold meaning of being and the way it shapes different ways of being ethical that dwell more and more intensively with what is at play in the ethos, that is to say in the metaxu.But it is not my task to do this; others have made the attempt more extensively in the papers reproduced here. I doubt whether they will be sufficient to bring to light all the rich dimensions of this book that is written at the same tempo as William speaks when discussing and, I suppose, when he goes running in the morning. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between theory and praxis by contrasting three different models of intellectual endeavor: totalizing, particular and decolonial. Attending to the critique that Gayatri Spivak raised against Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze in Can the Subaltern Speak?, this article advocates a dramaturgical reading of texts as a model for political theory to address subaltern agency. It reads such agency in the smile that Pier Paolo Pasolini registers in his 1967 film version of Sophocles’ play, Oedipus Tyrannos. Dramaturgically (...) read, Oedipus reveals another text, the tragic history of a yet insufficiently explored democratic alternative that goes against the established democracy and its complicity with inequality in the continued naturalization of slavery despite its foundation in equality. This subtext demands understanding Oedipus as a political production from the speechless agency of dissident servants, a more subversive aspect of democratic politics. (shrink)

This article examines a neglected dimension of Bazin's work, namely his writings for the daily newspaper Le Parisien libéré. Four key points emerge from this corpus. First, Bazin goes beyond the film-reviewing norms of the day to analyse the intentions and achievements of the film-makers. Second, Bazin foregrounds the capacity of cinema to address the concerns of contemporary society. Third, as a result, he ascribes a particular value to films that actively engage with the new social realities of post-war (...) France. Four, Bazin remains blind to the misogynistic dimension of post-war French cinema, with its tendency to culpabilize women for the national disgrace of the Occupation. Ultimately, Bazin's newspaper reviewing represents a more socially aware vision of cinema than that promoted by more specialized cinema journals, yet his criticism remains caught within the gender ideology of his time. (shrink)

This review essay critically discusses Andre Kukla's Methods of theoretical psychology. It is argued that Kukla mistakenly tries to build his case for theorizing in psychology as a separate discipline on a dubious distinction between theory and observation. He then argues that the demise of empiricism implies a return of some form of rationalism, which entails an autonomous role for theorizing in psychology. Having shown how this theory-observation dichotomy goes back to traditional and largely abandoned ideas in epistemology, (...) an alternative is presented in the guise of the pragmatist or functionalist tradition, where the interdependence of theory, observation and action is emphasized and the positivist dichotomy of pure observations and pure theory is rejected. Furthermore, we show how recent work on "active" perception supports the functionalist approach. Although the authors agree with Kukla that theory has a legitimate place in psychology, it is suggested that he needlessly limits its scope to autonomous domain-neutral theorizing, and that broadening its perspective to analyzing the presuppositions and implications of empirical work is a more fruitful approach. In fact, the attempt to find the epistemological and philosophical implications of empirical work in perception that is sketched in this review essay is, in the authors' view, a case of theorizing in psychology. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

In 1900, art historians André Jolles and Aby Warburg constructed an experimental dialogue in which Jolles supposed he had fallen in love with the figure of a young woman in a painting: “A fantastic figure—shall I call her a servant girl, or rather a classical nymph?…what is the meaning of it all?…Who is the nymph? Where does she come from?” Warburg’s response: “in essence she is an elemental spirit, a pagan goddess in exile,” serves as the touchstone for this wide-ranging (...) and theoretical exploration of female representation in iconography. In _Nymphs_, the newest translation of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s work, the author notes that academic research has lingered on the “pagan goddess,” while the concept of “elemental spirit,” ignored by scholars, is vital to the history of iconography. Tracing the genealogy of this idea, Agamben goes on to examine subjects as diverse as the aesthetic theories of choreographer Domineco da Piacenza, Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s essay on the “symbol,” Walter Benjamin’s concept of the dialectic image, and the bizarre discoveries of photographer Nathan Lerner in 1972. From these investigations, there emerges a startlingly original exploration of the ideas of time and the image. Agamben is the rare writer whose ideas and works have a broad appeal across many fields, and _Nymphs_ will engage not only the author’s devoted fans in philosophy, legal theory, sociology, and literary criticism, but his growing audience among art theorists and historians as well. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...) na escuridão nada vemos, no silêncio nada ouvimos, e que experienciar a ausência de luz e som é uma questão afetiva, e não perceptual. (shrink)

According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if valid and (...) sound, has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism, they have ways of answering to the argument. In this paper, I will grant the proponents of Conceptualism that one of their ways of answering to the Fineness of Grain Argument is successful, and that the argument can be blocked. But I will argue that, even if this is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. For there is another argument, that I will call the Constitution Argument, that has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I show that the Constitution Argument is valid and sound, in which case we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a (...) classical or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

Nottelman (2016) and Peels (2023) identify several categories of ignorance: factive, objectual, and practical, with erotetic ignorance —understood as the lack of knowledge of answers to questions—viewed as reducible to factive ignorance. This paper argues that erotetic ignorance is not in fact reducible to factive ignorance. More precisely, erotetic knowledge does not solely involve a relationship between a subject and a true proposition or set of propositions; instead, it involves a relationship between a subject, a true proposition or set of (...) propositions and epistemic goals of inquiry. (shrink)

Burge famously argued that one can have thoughts involving a concept C even if one’s understanding of C is incomplete. Even though this view has been extremely influential, it has also been taken by critics as less than clear. The aim of this paper is to show that the cases imagined by Burge as being ones in which incomplete understanding of concepts is involved can be made clearer given an account of direct concept ascriptions—such as “Peter has the concept of (...) arthritis”—according to which these ascriptions are to be analysed in terms of ascriptions of the knowledge of what something is. The upshot is that the cases imagined by Burge can be explained is terms of the idea of subjects knowing in part what something is. (shrink)

We argue that the pivotal role assigned by Northoff to the principle of top-down modulation in catatonia might successfully be applied to other symptoms of schizophrenia, for example, hallucinations. Second, we propose that Northoff's account would benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the cognitive level of explanation. Finally, contrary to Northoff, we hypothesize that “top-down modulation” might play as important a role as “horizontal modulation” in affective-behavioral alterations.

The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. We compare our (...) interpretation with the rephrasal of knowability proposed by Edgington and Rabinowicz and Segerberg, inserting an actuality-operator. This proposal shares some key features with ours but suffers from requiring specific transworld-knowledge. We observe that potential knowledge involves no transworld-knowledge. We describe the logic of potential knowledge by providing models for interpreting the new operator. Finally we show that the knowability thesis can be added to elementary conditions on potential knowledge without collapsing modal distinctions. (shrink)

We consider motivations for acknowledging that people participate in multiple levels of economic agency. One of these levels is characterized in terms of subjective utility to the individual; another, frequently observed, level is characterized in terms of utility to social groups with which people identify. Following Bacharach, we describe such groups as ‘teams’. We review Bacharach’s theory of such identification in his account of ‘team reasoning’. While this conceptualization is useful, it applies only to processes supported by deliberation. As this (...) is only one of a range of causal mechanisms underlying behaviour by humans and other strategic agents, a more general account is desirable. We then argue that Stirling’s account of ‘conditional games’ achieves the desired generalization. (shrink)